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It is always a pleasure to be in Santiago and I am especially pleased 
to be able to join you at this annual conference which in its nine years 
has established a high reputation for the quality of the papers and 
the discussion.
This year’s conference is focusing on the subject of inflation 
targeting. I want to set the scene for the two days of discussions by 
putting this in a broader context. My aim this morning is to assess the 
benefits to the world economy of a low inflation environment. I will 
start by reviewing the progress made in almost every country in recent 
years towards achieving low inflation. I will next analyze the gains 
that have accompanied this changing environment—notably more 
rapid global growth, greater stability, and reduced vulnerability. And 
finally I will say something about the role the IMF plays in helping to 
foster an environment of low inflation, especially as we seek to support 
the policy reform efforts of our members.
Much has been written about the origins of the worldwide decline 
in inflation. Ken Rogoff has argued persuasively that globalization 
and the growing importance of competition as economies become 
more integrated have made a major contribution to lowering inflation. 
But, equally important, we experienced an inflationary environment, 
and we learned its costs. As these were better understood, advances 
in our understanding, and practice, of monetary policy enabled most 
countries to bring inflation rates down, as I shall argue shortly. 
It is clear that the more rapid growth of the world economy reflects, 
in part, improved macroeconomic management in general across an 
1. Keynote Address by the author at the Ninth Annual Conference of Central 
Bank of Chile.
Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edited by Frederic Mishkin and 
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile. © 2007 Central Bank of Chile.
03.Krueger 23-36.indd 01/03/2007, 18:09 2324 Anne O. Krueger
increasing number of countries. We’ve seen evidence of this in every 
region of the world.
The topic for this conference underlines the extent of the global 
interest in the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies. Twenty 
one countries currently have inflation targeting, and thirteen of those 
are emerging market economies. Inflation targeting isn’t appropriate 
for every country. But it has a remarkable record of success and it 
arouses interest among policymakers because it is a benchmark of 
best practice, to use the language of modern management. Its track 
record is good, if short. And as the discussion here will demonstrate, 
we are still learning.
We at the Fund have found there is equal interest among members 
in other aspects of macroeconomic management. As we all learn from 
the experience of others, we have been able to refine our definition 
of sound fiscal policies, for example, so that it encompasses public 
expenditure management, tax administration, and structural balance, 
among other things; with clear and effective budgetary control at all 
levels of government, and long-term debt sustainability so that fiscal 
objectives are not undermined.
There  is  also  an  increased  appreciation  of  the  extent  of 
complementarity of monetary, fiscal and indeed structural economic 
policies. We have seen enough examples of the problems that can ensue 
when structural and institutional weaknesses in one area can critically 
undermine policy achievements in another sphere of macroeconomic 
management. The failure to control inflation in the late 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s was at least a contributing factor to the disappointing growth 
performance in many parts of the world over an extended period.
THE COSTS OF INFLATION
Yet it is perhaps only with hindsight that we can truly appreciate 
the costs of the worldwide inflationary surge that we experienced from 
the 1970s onwards. We knew about the dangers and the very high 
costs of hyperinflation. We had seen what this could do to a society 
in Germany in the 1920s and again in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War. 
So the dangers of runaway inflation were clear. It undermined 
social cohesion. It distorted the economy in arbitrary ways. It 
redistributed wealth in a random fashion. It wiped out those, 
especially the poor, on fixed incomes and who were unable to hedge. 
It undermined longer-term growth prospects by creating uncertainty 
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and acting as a disincentive to longer-term investment.
What was less obvious in the 1960s and later was that many of 
these costs were not confined to episodes of hyperinflation. Inflation at 
moderate levels was thought to be manageable. Indeed, it was regarded 
by governments and many academics as a useful tool to circumvent 
budgetary constraints, as for example, with the U.S. government 
during the war in Vietnam. Inflating out of trouble was politically 
tempting for governments around the world; and it was regarded as 
imposing relatively few long-term economic costs.
Other actors in society readily conspired with governments. Those 
with incomes that rose in real terms and those with debts that could be 
monetized were untroubled by moderate inflation and often welcomed 
it. By and large, people in upper and middle income groups could 
protect themselves and their assets. The poor, the most vulnerable, 
were those hardest hit. 
The relaxed approach to inflation was already showing some 
signs of strain in the early 1970s. It was widely believed that the 
inflation rate could not be brought down without very high costs 
and that relatively high inflation would therefore always be with 
us. People thought the costs of reducing the inflation rate would be 
too great. But the policy response to the dramatic rise in the price of 
oil—by January 1974 it was 350 percent higher than the year before—
turned out to be both misguided and harmful. Attempts to ease the 
impact of the oil shock by accommodative monetary policy helped fuel 
inflationary pressures, undermined fiscal discipline and resulted in 
significantly weaker growth in most industrial countries. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, governments in both industrial and 
emerging market countries discovered that the more tolerant of 
inflation they were, the more inflation was likely to trend upwards, 
and the smaller the trade-off, if any, perceived between more 
unemployment and more inflation. 
Inflation is damaging in its own right: it distorts the calculus of 
profitability, encouraging short-term investments and projects at the 
expense of longer-term investment; and it diminishes the value of 
relative price signals. But weak government responses that try to 
contain inflation simply raise its costs. Trying to administer price 
controls introduces further distortions into the economy without 
addressing the fundamental problem. Providing subsidies to offset cost 
increases feeds through to the fiscal deficit and accelerates inflation. 
In this context, the British experience is a salutary one. In the 
1970s, successive British governments struggled to control, let alone 
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reduce, inflation through a variety of means: voluntary and statutory 
wage restraints, and price controls. In the 1980s, the emphasis 
shifted to control of the money supply and, in turn, the adoption of 
an exchange rate anchor. Each of these approaches achieved some 
short-term success. But governments, especially in the 1980s, were 
too quick to assume that success would be long-lasting. They relaxed 
their grip, loosened policy and could then only watch as the rate of 
inflation rose once more. 
Continuing failures undermined the efforts of the authorities 
to establish credibility for themselves. And the failure to build 
credibility in turn undermined the confidence of economic actors 
about the long-term prospects for price stability.
Among the industrial countries, Britain had perhaps the worst 
chronic problem with inflation. But the stop-go cycle familiar to Britons 
was equally familiar to many in emerging market economies. The 
reforms introduced in Turkey from 1980 onwards were undermined 
to a considerable extent because of the persistent failure to tackle 
the problem of inflation. The result was the boom-bust cycle that 
characterized Turkish economy policy until 2000, with inflation 
averaging well above 60 percent over two decades and, crucially, 
lower average rates of growth than would have been possible in a 
low inflation environment.
THE SUCCESS OF COUNTER-INFLATIONARY POLICY
Conversely, countries that were successful in reducing inflation 
experienced more rapid growth. In the United States, the Federal 
Reserve under Paul Volcker re-established its credibility in counter-
inflationary policy, and Alan Greenspan consolidated it. In the past 
two decades or so, the U.S. economy has been one of the most rapidly 
growing industrial countries and, indeed, over that period has grown 
more rapidly than many emerging market and low income countries. 
Canada and Australia, too, have experienced more rapid growth, 
in part as a result of sound macroeconomic policies, not least of which 
is effective monetary policy.
And following monetary policy reforms started in 1992, Britain 
has at last overcome its chronic inflation problem. Inflation declined 
sharply in the wake of the reforms, and has remained low as a result 
of the implementation of a credible monetary policy, including inflation 
targeting. In 1997 these reforms were buttressed when the Bank of 
England became independent. From its most recent peak, almost 8 
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percent in 1991, the inflation rate has declined almost continuously: 
it is projected to be 1.99 percent this year, almost exactly the target 
rate of 2 percent. 
The consequence of the markedly improved inflation performance 
in Britain has been more than a decade of uninterrupted growth.
Among emerging market economies, of course, it would be hard to 
find a better example of successful counter-inflationary strategy than 
Chile. In the early 1970s, inflation averaged somewhere between 500 
percent and 1000 percent depending on the index used. Yet since that 
time, with only a few brief exceptions, inflation has declined sharply.
In 1980, steps were taken to insulate monetary policy from the 
political process; and in 1989, the central bank was made independent. 
Inflation targeting was introduced from 1990. The results of these policy 
reforms are clear. The average inflation rate has fallen in successive 
decades. In the ten years to 2004 the average inflation rate was below 
5 percent. In September, twelve month inflation was 3.8 percent. 
The result of these policies, along with reforms in other areas, 
including fiscal, social security and trade policies, has been sustained 
and high growth rates over a very long period. Chile stands out 
among its neighbors, but also among emerging market economies 
more generally, as a strong and stable economy, growing rapidly and 
capable of withstanding shocks. 
More recently we have seen other dramatic examples of successful 
counter-inflationary policy. In Turkey reforms introduced from 2000 
onwards have been designed to bring macroeconomic stability and 
create the conditions for rapid growth. The success of these reforms 
has exceeded all expectations. In 1997, Turkish inflation peaked at 
almost 85 percent. This year it declined to single digits, for the first 
time in 35 years. That by itself is a remarkable achievement, and 
reflects the success of sound monetary and fiscal policies. But this 
decline in inflation has been achieved at a time of remarkably rapid 
economic growth. 
The progress made in countries like Chile and Turkey is indeed 
striking. But the drop in inflation is a truly global phenomenon. 
The global inflation rate has declined from an annual average 
of close to 15 percent in 1980-84 to 3.7 percent in 2004. The average 
inflation rate in the industrial economies fell from almost 9.5 percent 
between 1975 and 1979, and nearly 9 percent in the early 1980s, 
to 2 percent in 2004 and a projected 1.6 percent this year. 
In developing countries, the decline has been steeper and more 
rapid. In the early 1990s, the average inflation rate in developing 
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countries was just over 80 percent; by 2004, that had declined to 5.8 
percent, and is projected to rise only slightly, to 5.9 percent, this year. 
Even in the transition economies, which in the early 1990s experienced 
average inflation rates of more than 360 percent, the average rate of 
inflation was down to 9.2 percent in 2004.
Last year, only three of the IMF’s 184 members had inflation rates 
in excess of 40 percent: Angola, the Dominican Republic and Zimbabwe. 
Indeed, only eight countries experienced inflation above 20 percent last 
year and only 32 countries had double digit rates of inflation. That is a 
remarkable global transformation, relative to the 1970s and 1980s.
As I already noted, accompanying this significantly improved 
inflation performance has been more rapid global growth. In 2004, the 
world economy grew more rapidly than at any time in the past three 
decades, with growth in every region. Periods of global expansion are 
longer, and worldwide slowdowns are fewer and shorter. At a time of 
considerable geopolitical uncertainty and shocks that have included 
a sharp rise in oil prices, the world economy has exhibited more 
resilience than we would have anticipated a few years ago. Improved 
macroeconomic performance of which the fall in inflation rates is part 
goes at least part of the way towards explaining this.
TOWARDS PRICE STABILITY
In part, at least, the story of falling inflation worldwide is simply 
one of success breeding success. In many cases, initial efforts to curb 
and then permanently reverse the rise in inflation rates were made by 
policymakers confronting rates in excess of 20 percent. These efforts 
needed tough monetary medicine, with the focus particularly on 
quantitative controls on the money supply. Typically, this approach 
had, in its initial stages at least, a sharp impact on growth. 
But as persistence paid off, and inflation rates did indeed start 
to fall towards 10 percent, it became increasingly apparent that the 
benefits of lower inflation exceeded the short-term costs of counter-
inflationary policy; and that as inflationary expectations responded 
to declining inflation rates those benefits increased. As a result, the 
focus of policy shifted again, towards getting inflation rates into single 
digits, and aiming for price stability.
The adoption of inflation targeting has played a key role in 
the success that many countries have achieved in moving towards 
price stability. Inflation targeting has so far been successful in both 
the industrial and emerging market countries that have adopted 
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it. Regardless of the origins of the inflation targeting policy, the 
evidence suggests that inflation targeting can contribute significantly 
towards the achievement of price stability. It helps build credibility 
for the monetary authorities, crucial given the important role that 
expectations play in determining the future path of inflation. And 
in spite of the wide variations in the economic and institutional 
circumstances of the countries that have so far adopted inflation 
targeting, they share common factors: central bank independence, 
improvements in implementation and increasing transparency.
IMF research shows that missing the target may not undermine 
the longer-term success of a targeting regime. Among countries 
targeting stable inflation, the targets were missed about 30 percent 
of the time. Among countries seeking to achieve significant disinflation, 
the figure is even higher. This is not a sign that inflation targeting 
has failed however. No country has abandoned inflation targeting as 
a result of missing its targets, even when the target has been missed 
by a significant margin, or for a prolonged period. Rather, people have 
sought to learn from experience. Inflation targeting appears to be a 
resilient policy framework, providing flexibility in the face of shocks, 
as well as transparency and accountability. To be sure, credibility is a 
key aspect, and the monetary authorities must focus single-mindedly 
on the targets to which they commit.
Inflation targeting anchors expectations and so helps lock in 
the benefits of declining inflation. It strengthens the independence 
of the monetary authorities, and reduces the risk that short-term 
political objectives will undermine policy. And because experience 
with inflation targeting has tended to highlight the importance of 
transparency in policymaking, it has brought important and, we 
hope, lasting improvements in economic governance. Of course, 
there is still much to learn about why inflation targeting has been 
so successful and about its design and implementation and this is 
why we are here today.
THE BENEFITS OF LOW INFLATION
Inflation targeting has already contributed to our awareness of 
the benefits of low inflation. At one time, the most powerful argument 
in favor of firm policy action to reduce inflation was to reduce its 
associated costs, although it was perhaps not always appreciated that 
one of these costs was growth foregone. In countries that succeeded 
in reducing inflation, distortions were fewer. The uncertainty that 
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inhibited investment and affected consumers’ behavior was greatly 
reduced. The prospects for economic growth improved as did the ability 
to withstand shocks. Low and falling inflation made macroeconomic 
stability attainable.
But as inflation has declined worldwide, the benefits have 
become increasingly obvious. As I noted, economic growth has 
accelerated in those countries that have experienced significant 
declines in inflation. Even in Africa, the countries that have done 
most to achieve macroeconomic stability—of which low inflation is 
an essential element—are generally the ones that have started to see 
higher growth rates. In spite of higher oil prices and poor harvests, 
inflation performance has continued to improve across the continent. 
This year, 30 sub-Saharan African countries will achieve inflation 
rates in single digits, up from 28 countries in 2004. Average inflation 
rates across the region should fall to 8.3 percent next year. 
And the growth numbers are equally striking. The IMF expects 
three non-oil producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone—to experience real GDP growth in 
excess of 7 percent this year; growth in real per capita GDP should 
approach or exceed 5 percent in those countries. Ghana, Tanzania and 
Uganda are among other African economies with continuing strong 
performance. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole should grow by 5.3 percent 
next year. There is still a way to go to achieve growth rates that will 
permit significant poverty reduction, but compared with the growth 
rates experienced even just a few years ago, the signs are hopeful.
As the Chileans here today know, countries with low inflation do 
significantly better in terms of growth performance than countries 
with higher rates of inflation, even in the same region. Chile’s success 
over a prolonged period reflects a sustained commitment to reform 
across a wide range of economic policies. But low inflation has been a 
critical element of those reforms. Similarly in Turkey: rapid growth 
is the result of strict adherence to monetary, fiscal and structural 
reforms: but again, the objective of a rapid decline in inflation was a 
central part of the reform strategy. And Turkish growth rates during 
a period of major fiscal consolidation have been well above even the 
most optimistic expectations.
South Africa has experienced a doubling of its growth rate, to a 
projected 4.3 percent this year, compared with the average growth rate 
in the decade to 1996 of 1.7 percent. And its inflation rate has fallen 
dramatically over the same period from an average of 12 percent in 
the ten years to 1996 to 3.9 percent projected this year.
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As the benefits of low inflation become apparent, and as 
governments learn more about how to reduce inflation, so inflation 
is projected to continue to decline, albeit it at a much more modest 
pace according to the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook.
Beyond the recognition that economic performance improves as 
inflation declines, perhaps the most important lesson learned from 
the experience of recent years is that reducing inflation can impose 
fewer short-term costs on an economy that is sufficiently flexible than 
had previously been thought. The stop-go or boom-bust cycles to which 
I referred earlier had led many policymakers to believe that a rapid 
decline in inflation could only be achieved by severely squeezing domestic 
demand, with obviously painful consequences. This led policymakers, 
first, to postpone counter-inflationary policies until action was forced 
on them in the context of a crisis of one kind or another; and then to 
relax policy as rapidly as they could. The inevitable result of such an 
approach was a failure to ensure inflation was on a declining path. 
In recent years, however, we have seen that this cycle was far from 
inevitable. An increasing number of countries have experienced the 
benefits that Chile and others have long enjoyed—a virtuous circle, 
whereby low inflation helps create macroeconomic stability which 
is the prerequisite for sustained rapid growth. A credible monetary 
policy reduces economic uncertainty among all actors; and it reduces 
the distortions caused by actors anticipating a pickup in inflation.
Low inflation is also an important tool in the effort to reduce 
poverty. First, since the poor are those most vulnerable to the effects of 
high inflation and least able to hedge against the risks, sustained low 
inflation brings obvious benefits for them. And second, low inflation 
is a prerequisite for, and a precursor of, more rapid growth which is, 
in turn, essential for a sustained reduction in poverty.
But in this new world of low inflation other benefits are becoming 
apparent. The greater stability that national economies experience as 
a result of price stability has a global impact as more countries achieve 
it. Global growth is less volatile—and higher. Low inflation helps 
national economies reduce their vulnerability to shocks, and to cope 
more comfortably with cyclical slowdowns. This, too, has an impact on 
the global economy. The global slowdown of 2001 was more modest than 
previous episodes, and the world economy recovered more rapidly.
Low inflation ensures that there are fewer government-induced shocks 
in an economy, although it does not, of course, eliminate economic shocks 
altogether. Nor can it insulate economic actors, or national economies, or 
the global economy, from such shocks. But it does help reduce the impact 
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of those shocks. It can help raise potential growth rates and it can make 
economies more resilient. Effective monetary policy aimed at controlling 
inflation can also help offset the second round effects of shocks instead of 
exacerbating them as we saw in the 1970s oil price increases.
THE ROLE OF THE IMF
Essentially, I have been describing a global learning process as the 
benefits of low inflation have become increasingly apparent in recent years. 
We at the Fund have learned as much as anyone from this process. 
Just how far the economic profession has come in understanding 
the benefits to be had can be found in the October 1959 volume of IMF 
Staff Papers. U Tun Wai, then chief of the Statistics Division at the 
Fund, set out to explore the links between inflation and growth. Let 
me quote his opening sentence:
“The  relation  between  inflation  and  economic  growth  in  less 
developed countries is a subject on which there are still very wide 
differences of opinion.”
Mr. Tun Wai’s contribution was significant: using statistical 
analysis he was able to conclude that where the data existed for 
a long enough period, and for countries that had experienced 
wide variations in inflation, low inflation was clearly linked with 
economic growth.
The Fund works with members to advance the process of reducing 
the inflation rate in a number of ways. Surveillance is at the heart of 
the Fund’s work, of course. We conduct Article IV consultations with 
our members to identify policy weaknesses and successes. Where 
governments are seeking to implement appropriate polices we can 
be supportive; where we identify policy shortcomings we can try to 
persuade the authorities of the need for reforms.
Our surveillance work is greatly strengthened by the Fund’s 
unique cross-country insight. Our ability to monitor closely the 
economies of all 184 members enables us to identify what works and 
what doesn’t. It helps inform our research as we seek to improve our 
understanding. Our membership gains directly from that: they can 
benefit from experience elsewhere when shaping their own policy 
framework to their national concerns and priorities.
The Fund’s efforts go beyond surveillance and policy advice to 
technical assistance with policy implementation. This is particularly 
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important for our low income members. Having the right policy objectives 
is one thing: lacking the technical expertise to implement these objectives 
can be a significant obstacle for some countries, and the Fund can help. 
We provide technical assistance on a wide range of issues, not least in 
the area of monetary policy and central bank strategies.
And the Fund has been active in fostering research into, and 
discussion of, inflation targeting. The latest World Economic Outlook, 
for example, contains a wide-ranging assessment of experience with 
inflation targeting. And, as you can see from the conference timetable, 
IMF economists are presenting papers at this conference, a further 
reflection of the Fund’s active research agenda into this important 
topic. The more we know about inflation targeting, its effectiveness 
and its implementation, the more we can assist our members both 
through our surveillance work but also through the provision of advice 
and technical expertise to those countries adopting, or considering, 
inflation targeting.
THE ONGOING CHALLENGE
Much has been achieved in recent years in terms of delivering 
low inflation and experiencing the benefits of macroeconomic 
stability. The challenges for economists and policymakers going 
forward are threefold.
First is to ensure that the benefits are locked in-and that 
means putting in place policies that will continue to lower 
inflation and then maintain price stability within a given target 
range. Currently we are seeing a worrying tendency among some 
governments to try to protect consumers from the impact of higher 
oil prices. This is distortionary, and the fiscal impact can itself 
be inflationary: it is not possible to protect economic actors from 
market realities indefinitely. Trying to do so stores up enormous 
problems for governments: the cost of subsidies, for example, places 
an unsustainable burden on government budgets, undermining 
attempts to maintain fiscal discipline. If consumers are not exposed 
to market realities they will not have the incentive to adjust their 
behavior and, in the case of higher oil prices, act to conserve energy 
and so reduce demand for oil. 
The consequences of such distorting behavior will, ultimately, 
be higher inflation rates and lower growth rates as the objectives 
of macroeconomic stability are progressively undermined. So far in 
most countries there is little evidence of second round effects of the 
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energy price increases. It is particularly encouraging, for example, to 
see the government of Indonesia recognizing the inherent dangers of 
fuel subsidies and seeking to remove them and provide direct targeted 
assistance to the poor who are most vulnerable to the effects of more 
expensive fuel.
The second challenge facing policymakers is, in a sense, a 
consequence of recent success in achieving price stability. How far 
should policies to lower inflation go? I noted that the costs of lowering 
inflation, when there is sufficient flexibility in the economy, had been 
much less than had been assumed by many policymakers in the past. 
That is certainly true. When we look at the more rapid growth that 
has accompanied the dramatic fall in Turkish inflation, for example, 
we can see clearly that the benefits far outweigh the costs. 
And finally, we need to know far more than we yet do about the 
transition to inflation targeting: how best to design and implement 
the new framework, and how to decide on issues such as defining 
the target and introducing an appropriate degree of transparency. 
Which brings us to this conference. These, of course, are some of the 
issues that will be discussed here over the next two days. 
CONCLUSION
So let me sum up briefly. The sharp decline in inflation rates we have 
witnessed has been as remarkable as it has been widespread. It has been 
achieved at a lower cost than we would have thought possible twenty 
five years ago; and the benefits have been greater than once seemed 
likely. Low inflation has been at the heart of the improved economic 
performance we have witnessed. No country has achieved sustained 
rapid growth without low inflation—just as no country has achieved 
sustained rapid growth without opening up to the rest of the world.
Successful monetary policy that consistently delivers low inflation 
is therefore critical to long-term economic success. And monetary policy 
can only be successful over time with a proper institutional framework, 
one that makes it difficult for long-term stability to be sacrificed for 
short-term political advantage. Inflation targeting is clearly one 
solution that provides this framework, hence its attractiveness for 
many, and hence the focus of this conference.
The challenges I have identified for policymakers going forward 
are a consequence of success. When inflation is high, or rising rapidly, 
the question of how to maintain price stability once achieved seems a 
rather less pressing one. These are challenges that apply regardless 
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of the means adopted for achieving and maintaining price stability. 
But any policy framework must be capable of assuring its continuity. 
And any framework needs some way of assessing the benefits and 
costs of particular policy options if it is to succeed over the medium 
and longer term. 
This is an area where the Fund, with the unique overview that 
its surveillance provides, along with the extensive research work 
we undertake, can contribute. We can help identify best practice in 
inflation targeting; and, as we do in many other areas of economic 
policy, provide advice, support and technical assistance tailored to the 
individual needs of our member countries.
As a relatively new development in economic policymaking, 
inflation targeting is an area rich in opportunities for research. 
We have much to learn, and countries seeking to achieve price 
stability have, potentially, much to gain from the fruits of economic 
research—and from the Fund’s surveillance activities. This conference 
is therefore both timely and important and I look forward to hearing 
much of the discussion.
Thank you. 
03.Krueger 23-36.indd 01/03/2007, 18:09 35